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Regulation Uber Alles: How Governments Hurt
Workers and Consumers in the New New
Economy
Ilya Shapiro† & David McDonald††

“Government’s view of the economy could be summed up in a few
short phrases: If it moves, tax it. If it keeps moving, regulate it.
And if it stops moving, subsidize it.”
—Ronald Reagan1
Innovation always outpaces regulation. In recent years, regulators
have struggled to remain relevant in a digital economy that appears to
neither want nor need their interference. Taxi medallions were for
decades the safest investment in America, always increasing in value
as demand for transportation exceeded the supply provided by citysanctioned taxi cartels. The development of rideshare applications like
Uber and Lyft upended that heavily regulated industry practically
overnight. Similar things have occurred in the hospitality industry with
Airbnb, and even areas like law and medicine have been significantly
affected by technological innovation.
The disruption caused by new business models has led to push-back
from legislatures and administrative agencies—as well as the
entrenched interests those parties serve. These reactions, while
ostensibly made with consumer and employee welfare in mind, have
actually harmed the ordinary people they claim to protect, with favored
insiders benefiting from decreased competition. But even though the
legacy interests holding back the sharing economy are taxi cartels and
hotel chains, that doesn’t mean governments should instead subsidize
their competitors, the way some cities are beginning to do as a stopgap
solution to public-transport problems. Uber is now a nimble, innovative
company, but given the opportunity to capture regulators and gain
†

Senior Fellow in Constitutional Studies, Cato Institute; J.D., University of Chicago, 2003.
Legal Associate, Cato Institute; J.D., Columbia University, 2016.
1
Remarks to State Chairpersons of the National White House Conference on Small Business
(Aug. 15, 1986).
††
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unfair advantage over the next generation of market entrants, it will do
so.
In Section I of this article, we describe the costs of restrictive
regulations, considering such unintended effects as the stifling of
innovation, regulatory capture by established businesses to secure
market share, and the disproportionate effects on the poor and
marginalized. Section II treats the tendency of subsidization and other
forms of patronage to distort prices while raising demand, interfering
with incentives, and undermining democracy. Ultimately, there’s great
arrogance in picking winners and losers. We can’t see the future, so any
attempt to control the economy will have unintended consequences—
more often than not trying to preserve established business models and
stifling innovation. What the economy of the future needs isn’t artisanal
regulation for every new technology, but a stable and predictable legal
framework that allows companies to plan for the future without being
hamstrung in the present.
I.

RESTRICTIVE REGULATIONS AND OUTRIGHT BANS

Regulations are generally promulgated in reaction to a perceived
problem. A legislature or executive agency sees companies engaging in
dangerous activity, or a certain industry failing, or global temperatures
rising, and begins working on some sort of solution. It’s an incredibly
complex process whereby drafters sift through massive amounts of
data, respond to the concerns of the many people whom the regulations
may affect, and anticipate wide-ranging consequences. This is difficult
enough to do with problems that can be directly observed. When
regulators try to be forward-thinking and draft regulations to solve
future problems, it gets even more complicated. Good information is
much harder to come by; regulators must rely on sometimes shaky
predictions.
A.

Generally
1.

Stifling Innovation

All regulations will have unintended consequences somewhere
down the line. Even when regulators try to anticipate future conditions,
they simply don’t have the information necessary to completely mitigate
the negative consequences of their actions. There are high costs for
getting it wrong, especially in situations where technology and business
models are changing rapidly. Nobel Prize-winning economist Friedrich
Hayek spoke often about how little information central planners tend
to actually have about the economies they attempt to control:
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“Economists operate with the fictitious assumption that all the relevant
data is known, but this is totally unrealistic. Nobody knows all the data.
What we have is widely dispersed knowledge, which cannot be
concentrated in one mind.”2 It is a special arrogance that allows us to
believe that a single person or agency—regardless of how educated and
intelligent they may be—can possibly aggregate and apply enough
information to craft wide-ranging regulations that neither provide
beneficial incentives nor produce unforeseen consequences. Hayek
called this the “fatal conceit.”
Regulatory costs can be direct, as when new airborne particulate
matter standards under the Clean Air Act mandate new filtration
systems.3 While these costs are significant—the Environmental
Protection Agency predicts that the annual direct compliance costs for
the Clean Air Act will reach $65 billion by 20204—they’re dwarfed by
the indirect costs, which agencies often conveniently neglect to discuss.5
Indirect costs include things such as layoffs or decreased hiring,
and reduced investment in firms’ capital stock.6 Shifting resources into
compliance forces firms to cut spending elsewhere, meaning that
divisions are merged or dropped and planned expansions are held up,
with the corresponding jobs lost or never created. Decreased profits also
make industries less attractive to investors. These kinds of indirect
costs are not only bad for the firms themselves, but for the larger
economy, because retarded job growth and capital investment affect
labor and investment markets. There are also less tangible costs, such
2

DIEGO PIZANO, A Conversation with Professor Friedrich A. Hayek, IN CONVERSATIONS WITH
GREAT ECONOMISTS 9 (2009).
3
See, e.g., EPA OFFICE OF AIR AND RADIATION, THE BENEFITS AND COSTS OF THE CLEAN AIR
ACT FROM 1990 TO 2020 6 n. 4 (2011), https://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2015-07/docu
ments/summaryreport.pdf [https://perma.cc/7F9D-6BVC].
4
Id. at 2 (where the EPA specifically only looked at “direct” costs when assessing the twentyyear impact of the Clean Air Act).
5
See, e.g., id. at 6. In discussing economists’ tendency to consider only those effects that are
“seen” and ignoring the “unseen,” Frédéric Bastiat tells the story of a shopkeeper whose son breaks
a window. His neighbors remark that this hardship is at least good for the local economy, for
“[w]hat would become of the glaziers if no one ever broke a window?” Bastiat counters that the
money used to replace the window could have been used for new shoes or a new book, and that the
only thing that has changed is that the world now has one less window. The “forgotten man” who
misses out on a sale due to the broken window “makes us understand how absurd it is to see a
profit in destruction. It is he who will soon teach us that it is equally absurd to see a profit in trade
restriction, which is, after all, nothing more nor less than partial destruction.” Frédéric Bastiat,
What Is Seen and What Is Not Seen, in SELECTED ESSAYS ON POLITICAL ECONOMY 1–4 (George B.
de Huszar ed., Seymour Cain trans., William Volker Fund 1964) (1850).
6
Michael Greenstone, The Impacts of Environmental Regulations on Industrial Activity:
Evidence from the 1970 and 1977 Clean Air Act Amendments and the Census of Manufactures, 110
J. POL. ECON. 1175, 1198–1202 (2002) (finding statistically significant negative correlations
between EPA enforcement against firms with “non-attainment status” in regard to Clean Air Act
emission standards and both employment growth and capital stock growth rate).
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as that the piling on of complicated and ambiguous regulations
increases uncertainty, chills beneficial activity, and ties up in litigation
vast amounts of money (public and private) that could be used for
creative purposes.7
Regulatory costs—both direct and indirect, “seen” and “unseen”—
can significantly impede innovation in two major ways that we have
already alluded to: (1) as resources are reallocated to account for
compliance (or litigation) costs, fewer resources are available for
research and development, upgrading equipment, and investing in the
young employees most likely to introduce new ideas; and (2) onerous
regulations make engaging in innovative behavior both more costly and
more risky. The consequences of pushing the regulatory envelope may
simply be too high to risk productive activities that could raise
regulators’ hackles.
There is considerable debate over just how much various
regulations cost to implement, and how much benefit they provide in
return. There is no shortage of reports conducting some form of costbenefit analysis on different regulatory efforts, many published by the
agencies themselves under the requirements of Executive Order
12,866.8 For example, the EPA avers that the Clean Air Act will have
generated $65 billion in direct costs and almost $2 trillion in direct
benefits annually by 2020.9 A number of scholars have claimed that
high regulatory costs are little more than a myth, with the generalized
societal benefits of regulation far outweighing any compliance costs
firms may face.10 These studies, however, nearly always underestimate
costs by ignoring the indirect and social costs of regulation, while
including generous and attenuated assumptions about the benefits.11 In
contrast, a 2003 paper analyzing the cost-effectiveness of seventy-six
regulatory actions taken between 1967 and 2001, that explicitly adjusts
for the fact that “organizations public and private tend to overstate the

7

See Michael P. Van Alstine, The Costs of Legal Change, 49 UCLA L. REV. 789, 822–36 (2002)
(outlining the ways legal uncertainty in the wake of new legislation or regulation increases
compliance costs).
8
Exec. Ord. No. 12,866, 3 C.F.R. § 638 (1993) (Executive Order 12,866 is the executive order
under which the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA) operates. It requires that
agencies prepare detailed cost-benefit reports on all economically significant regulations.).
9
EPA OFFICE OF AIR AND RADIATION, supra note 3, at 2.
10
See generally, e.g., Frank Ackerman, The Unbearable Lightness of Regulatory Costs, 33
FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1071 (2005–2006); E.B. GOODSTEIN, JOBS AND THE ENVIRONMENT: THE MYTH
OF A NATIONAL TRADE-OFF (1994), http://epi.3cdn.net/83dfae8d6d0c6151e1_55m6id8x6.pdf [htt
ps://perma.cc/M4AT-4WFJ].
11
See generally Ackerman, supra note 10; Goodstein, supra note 10, at 19–25.
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effectiveness of their actions,” found that a significant proportion of
regulations caused more harm than good.12
The industry insiders who usually have significant influence over
how their regulations are written and enforced have little incentive to
make it easier for innovative upstarts to chip away at their market
share. We address regulatory capture at greater length in the next
section, but it’s important to discuss how this phenomenon is likely to
affect innovation. Even when using a scalpel, attempting to carefully
balance incentives and formulate nuanced rules, regulators can doom
innovation in any number of ways. But government doesn’t always use
a scalpel—and has been known to bring down the hammer and ban new
technologies or business models outright.13 It should be fairly obvious
how such extreme policies stifle innovation: it’s hard to innovate when
innovation itself is illegal. Yet it’s important to note that not all
regulation is even close to as tactical and nuanced as the deeply
problematic methods discussed throughout this article.
2.

Regulatory Capture

Overregulation can have disastrous effects on the economy even
when it is a good faith, honest effort to protect employees, the public,
the environment, etc. Unfortunately, good faith cannot always be
assumed. Much regulation—particularly at the local and less publicly
visible levels—is written and enforced with only token justifications
that it is in the public interest. Regulators often become “captured” by
well-connected industry players, meaning that established interests
influence officials to promulgate rules that benefit themselves rather
than society as a whole. Occasionally, these interests skip the whole

12

John F. Morrall III, Saving Lives: A Review of the Record 9, 15–17 (AEI-Brookings Joint
Center, Working Paper No. 03-6, 2003), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=
424523 [https://perma.cc/BX8F-YTWW] (The opportunity costs of regulations—some of the
resources used “would have been used to reduce risk in the absence of regulation”—led the author
to conclude that only twenty-seven of the seventy-six regulations analyzed (more than a third)
actually did more harm than good).
13
In addition to the government reactions to Uber and Airbnb discussed at length in this
article, regulators’ “shoot first, ask questions later” approach can be seen in some of their reactions
to other emerging tech companies such as the DYI legal assistance site LegalZoom, Robert
Ambrogi, Latest Legal Victory has LegalZoom Poised for Growth, ABA JOURNAL (Aug. 1, 2014),
http://www.abajournal.com/magazine/article/latest_legal_victory_has_legalzoom_poised_for_grow
th [https://perma.cc/FRF9-B2QJ]; daily fantasy sports websites like FanDuel, Ryan Rodenberg,
Daily Fantasy Sports State-by-State Tracker, ESPN (Aug. 27, 2016), http://www.espn.com/chalk/
story/_/id/14799449/daily-fantasy-dfs-legalization-tracker-all-50-states [https://perma.cc/CP4J-W
4JC]; and homemade food startups like Homemade and Josephine, Sarah Kessler, The FoodSharing Economy Is Delicious and Illegal—Will It Survive?, FAST COMPANY: GIGGED (Jul. 7, 2016),
https://www.fastcompany.com/3061498/the-food-sharing-economy-is-delicious-and-illegal-will-itsurvive [https://perma.cc/HE2L-KMWS].
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“influence” part and simply regulate their competitors directly, as
dentists did in North Carolina before the arrangement was struck down
by the Supreme Court.14 It “occurs when most or all of the benefits of a
program go to some single, reasonably small interest (an industry,
profession, or locality) but most or all of the costs will be borne by a
large number of people (for example, all taxpayers).”15 And the more
heavily regulated an industry, the more incentive there is for firms to
work to capture its regulators. This is a particularly dangerous
situation, because:
if a firm succeeds in capturing its regulator, it and perhaps a
handful of other incumbents will reap the benefits of enhanced
profits, while a large and diffuse group of consumers will bear
the costs. . . . [and] small, concentrated interests often find it
easier to organize for their collective benefit than do large and
diffuse interests.16
Thus we arrive at the current situation, with an untold number of anticonsumer “consumer protection” regulations on the books, funneling
money and power into private hands.
Barriers to entry are often hidden within consumer or
environmental advocacy. For example, traditional African hairbraiders
are required to spend thousands of hours in barber schools, ostensibly
to protect their customers’ safety—even though ninety percent of the
curriculum is irrelevant to their profession, hairbraiding is neither
taught nor tested, and there’s no evidence that unlicensed hairbraiders
pose any threat to public health.17 Both the primary backers of the
regulations and those sitting on licensing boards tend to be the very
barbers and hairdressers who would be in direct competition with
hairbraiders. Wisconsin bans the selling of home-baked goods on publicsafety grounds, even though the policy applies to items the state deems
“not potentially hazardous” and lobbying to protect the ban has been
dominated by incumbent commercial bakers.18 Attempts by taxi cartels
14

See generally, e.g., N.C. State Bd. of Dental Exam’rs v. FTC, 135 S.Ct. 1101 (2015) (where
a state dental board consisting of dental professionals tried to exclude others from providing teethwhitening services after dentists complained about the low prices these competitors charged).
15
JAMES Q. WILSON, BUREAUCRACY 76 (1989).
16
Christopher Koopman et al., The Sharing Economy and Consumer Protection Regulation:
The Case for Policy Change, 8 J. BUS., ENTREPRENEURSHIP & L. 529, 534–35 (2015) (citing MANCUR
OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION: PUBLIC GOODS AND THE THEORY OF GROUPS (Harvard
Univ. Press rev. ed. 1965)).
17
See, e.g., Niang v. Carroll, No. 4:14 CV 1100, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 127885 (E.D. Mo. Sept.
20, 2016).
18
Complaint at 1–2, 6, 10, Kivirist v. Wis. Dep’t of Agric., No. 2016-CV-000006 (Wis. Cir. Ct.
Jan. 13, 2016), http://ij.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/01/Wisconsin-complaint.pdf [https://perma.
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to keep out ridesharing apps are justified through fearmongering over
perceived consumer-safety issues.19
Even some of the most obvious examples of benevolent governance
turn out to be self-interested attempts at quashing competition when
critically examined. This sort of disconnect between appearance and
reality is perhaps best illustrated by the famous Supreme Court case
Lochner v. New York, in which the Court struck down New York’s
maximum-hours law for bakers.20 Lochner, a part of the popularly
reviled “anticanon,” is taught in law schools around the country as the
worst example of judicial activism.21 According to the traditional
narrative, the Court rejected constitutional precedent in order to force
its laissez faire politics into law and protect business interests from
Progressive reforms. But recent scholarship by David Bernstein and
others has shed new light on the case.22 New York’s law, much less than
an attempt to protect workers from exploitation, was pushed by the
large, unionized bakeries as a way of putting out small entrepreneurs—
particularly bakeries owned by recent Jewish, Italian, and French
immigrants—who couldn’t absorb the increased labor costs.23 The
xenophobic and anti-competitive motivations behind the law have been
excised from law school curricula (except, of course, at the fine
institution that publishes this law journal).
These are merely a handful of the anti-competitive sham healthand-safety regulations that have recently been challenged in court.
When legislatures and agencies insist on controlling the economy at this
granular a level, the incentives for incumbents to lobby for barriers to
entry are simply too alluring to resist. Large, powerful incumbents will
invariably push rules that affect only their potential competitors, and
when that fails will support byzantine regulatory regimes because
they’re the only ones who can absorb the compliance costs—a sort of
tribute to the government that’s easier than actually competing. It’s
telling that this kind of cronyism—big business exploiting relationships
with regulators to wield state power for pecuniary gain—can even put
cc/RE8Z-FBG2].
19
See Part I.B, infra.
20
198 U.S. 45 (1905).
21
See generally Jamal Greene, The Anticanon, 125 HARV. L. REV. 379, 380–81 (2011) (“Each
case embodies a set of propositions that all legitimate constitutional decisions must be prepared
to refute. Together, they map out the land mines of the American constitutional order, and thereby
help to constitute that order: we are what we are not.”).
22
See generally DAVID E. BERNSTEIN, REHABILITATING LOCHNER (2011).
23
Id. at 23–29. The person who filed the complaint against Joseph Lochner was actually a
longtime employee with whom Lochner had a “close and longstanding relationship.” There is no
indication that Lochner’s bakery was ever a particularly dangerous, dirty, or unhealthy place to
work. Id. at 29.
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rifle-toting Tea Partiers and drum-circling Occupy Wall Streeters on
the same side.
3.

How the Poor and Marginalized Always Bear the Highest
Cost

Businesses generally respond to increased costs in one or more
ways: raising prices, cutting staff, reducing dividends, shifting
resources from reinvestment to operations, lowering the quality of the
goods or services provided, or simply leaving the jurisdiction altogether.
One thing most of these responses have in common is that the negative
consequences ultimately fall hardest on the poor. For those earning a
middle-class salary, a moderate increase in rent or the price of gas is
inconsequential. These costs can be absorbed by the rest of the budget,
and requires maybe cutting down the number of meals eaten out or
waiting an extra few months to upgrade to the new iPhone. But for a
single mom working two jobs, higher rent means having to move to a
less-safe neighborhood farther from work. Higher transportation costs
mean no more travelling to see relatives over the holidays. Those
marginal cost increases—the kind seen by well-meaning policy-makers
as reasonable prices to pay for “consumer protection”—can inflict big
harms on consumers who simply don’t have extra cash.24
Low-income people are also the ones working the jobs that are the
first to go when companies feel pressured from lower profits; low-skill
jobs are the easiest to automate when the companies determine that the
payroll is no longer structurally sustainable. The most obvious
examples are assembly-line workers whose factories move overseas, or
fast-food workers being replaced with self-serve computer terminals in
places that raise the minimum wage.25
While money may not buy happiness, it does buy options. To the
person of means who buys her groceries from Whole Foods and clothes
from upscale boutiques—or even Macy’s—the local Wal-Mart is an
eyesore. It’s a giant, ugly building that person will never set foot in,
filled with a class of people she never meets and low-quality items she
would never buy. Supporting restrictive zoning that prevents big-box
24

See Dustin Chambers & Courtney A. Collins, How Do Federal Regulations Affect Consumer
Prices? An Analysis of the Regressive Effects of Regulation 20–21 (Mercatus Center, Working
Paper, 2016), https://www.mercatus.org/system/files/Chambers-How-Regs-Affect-Prices-v2.pdf
[https://perma.cc/M43P-7VAU] (finding that increases in consumer prices associated with
increased regulation disproportionately disadvantage low-income households).
25
See Darrell M. West & Jack Karsten, Rising Minimum Wages Make Automation More CostEffective, BROOKINGS INST.: TECHTANK (Sept. 30, 2015), https://www.brookings.edu/blog/techtank/
2015/09/30/rising-minimum-wages-make-automation-more-cost-effective/ [http://perma.cc/LTK4FD55].
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stores from opening is a no-brainer, improving the aesthetic quality of
the neighborhood and leaving room for “authentic” mom-and-pop
retailers. But that person isn’t cutting coupons or buying in bulk to
stretch a food budget. She has plenty of options, so why would she care
that Wal-Mart is the only store within 25 miles that sells groceries
cheap enough for a family to be able to eat nutritious dinners? As Nobel
Prize-winning economist Milton Friedman once explained:
Industrial progress, mechanical improvement, all of the great
wonders of the modern era have meant relatively little to the
wealthy. The rich in ancient Greece would have benefited hardly
at all from modern plumbing: running servants replaced
running water. Television and radio—the patricians of Rome
could enjoy the leading musicians and actors in their home,
could have the leading artists as domestic retainers. Ready-towear clothing, supermarkets—all these and many other modern
developments would have added little to their life. They would
have welcomed the improvements in transportation and in
medicine, but for the rest, the great achievements of Western
capitalism have rebounded primarily to the benefit of the
ordinary person. These achievements have made available to the
masses conveniences and amenities that were previously the
exclusive prerogative of the rich and powerful.26
This is the problem that regulators who refuse to acknowledge the
impact their policies have on prices fail to understand. Low-cost
consumer goods and services—often sold at razor-thin margins—are
extremely important to the well-being of the large number of Americans
who cannot afford to purchase more expensive replacements or travel
long distances to shop, as are the sorts of jobs that the upper-middle
class people making policy decisions might scoff at.
B.

Uber
1.

Employees vs. Independent Contractors

Uber is currently embroiled in a legal battle over the designation
of its drivers. In April 2016, the company reached a proposed settlement
in two cases in which the plaintiff drivers argued that they were
employees, not independent contractors, and were thus entitled to
expense reimbursement and the full gratuity paid by riders through the

26

MILTON FRIEDMAN & ROSE FRIEDMAN, FREE TO CHOOSE 147–48 (1980).
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Uber app.27 The essence of the plaintiffs’ arguments is that drivers have
to comply with Uber’s requirements lest they receive low grades and
even be terminated, and yet Uber classifies them as independent
contractors not entitled to reimbursement for car maintenance or the
protections of wage and labor laws. 28
In the proposed settlement, the parties did not alter Uber’s
classification of drivers as independent contractors, but Uber agreed to
pay $84 million. Further, Uber agreed to provide drivers with more
information about their rating, not deactivate drivers for regularly
turning down ride requests, and create a drivers’ association to ensure
that drivers have a voice in the company’s operations. But the judge
handling the two cases has now rejected the settlement upon concluding
that it “as a whole as currently structured is not fair, adequate, and
reasonable.”29
The strange thing about those purporting to represent the interests
of Uber drivers—both in the courts and in the editorial pages—is that
they’re not particularly representative of actual Uber drivers. The vast
majority of Uber drivers do not drive full-time. For the typical Uber
driver, taking fares is a side gig to earn extra cash or supplement a fixed
income. In a December 2014 survey of 601 active Uber drivers, only
twenty-four percent reported that Uber was their only source of
income.30 The most common reasons given for driving with Uber were:
“to earn more income to better support myself or my family” (91
percent); “to be my own boss and set my own schedule” (87
percent); “to have more flexibility in my schedule and balance
my work with my life and family” (85 percent); “to help maintain
a steady income because other sources of income are
unstable/unpredictable” (74 percent).31

27

See Travis Kalanick, Growing and Growing Up, UBER NEWSROOM (Apr. 21, 2016),
https://newsroom.uber.com/growing-and-growing-up [https://perma.cc/JQ5H-Q8RL]; O’Connor v.
Uber Techs., Inc., No. 13-cv-03826, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 110281, at *11 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 18, 2016)
(merged for settlement with Yucesoy v. Uber Techs., Inc., No. C-15-00262, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
98515 (N.D. Cal. Jul. 28, 2015)).
28
See Second Amended Complaint at 5, O’Connor v. Uber Techs., Inc., No. 13-03826 (N.D.
Cal. Nov. 17, 2014), http://uberlitigation.com/docs/1.pdf [https://perma.cc/E4J7-E9HT]; Rachel
Emma Silverman, Uber, Lyft Cases Focus on Drivers’ Legal Status, WALL ST. J. (Mar. 15, 2015),
http://www.wsj.com/articles/uber-lyft-cases-could-help-clarify-drivers-legal-status-1426456519
[http://perma.cc/F9CJ-7T93].
29
O’Connor, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 110281, at *75.
30
JONATHAN V. HALL & ALAN B. KRUEGER, AN ANALYSIS OF THE LABOR MARKET FOR UBER’S
DRIVER-PARTNERS IN THE UNITED STATES 11 (2015), https://s3.amazonaws.com/uber-static/comms/
PDF/Uber_Driver-Partners_Hall_Kreuger_2015.pdf [http://perma.cc/FTF4-JE8A].
31
Id.
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Forty-two percent of women and twenty-nine percent of men said that
a major reason for driving with Uber was that they “‘can only work parttime or flexible schedules’ because of a ‘family, education, or health
reason,’” and thirty-two percent of drivers said that flexibility in order
to find a “steady, full-time job” was “a major reason” for driving with
Uber.32
For many people who drive for Uber, the current system’s
flexibility is one of the company’s biggest draws. College students,
parents of young children, and others who need a source of income that
can accommodate irregular schedules would be greatly disserviced by
Uber’s switching to an employer/employee model—which would mean
forcing Uber to fit its new square peg into the old round regulatory hole.
Moreover, these kinds of drivers would probably not even qualify for
many of the benefits that the activists are advocating.33 But they would
still be stuck with the tradeoffs—such as giving up the ability to choose
when and where they work and being limited in the number of hours
they can work.34 This would make driving for Uber much less appealing,
and could even force drivers to choose between Uber and their other job
or passion. It is quite possible that at least some would lose their jobs
as Uber lays off drivers it can no longer afford.
The fight for employee status is defined by the concept of
“concentrated benefits, dispersed costs.” This holds true among the
drivers, only a small percentage of whom actually see driving for Uber
as a full-time occupation. It also holds true more broadly. Increased
labor costs will be pushed onto consumers in the form of higher rates,
fewer drivers, and longer waits. This impact will fall hardest on those
consumers who are poor and geographically isolated. Professionals
using Uber as a designated driver on a Friday night or as a makeshift
car service can afford to pay a premium. They have disposable income
and in the absence of ridesharing apps, they would default to higherpriced taxis and black cars. Poor people who don’t have access to a car,
however, and who rely on Uber as a relatively affordable way to get to

32

Id. at 11–12.
Many benefits are contingent on hours worked. For example, under the Affordable Care
Act, employees do not qualify for employer provided health insurance unless they work at least
thirty hours per week. 26 U.S.C. § 4980H(c)(4). This would exclude most of Uber’s drivers, half of
whom work less than fifteen hours per week and 85 percent of whom work less than 35 hours per
week. Id. at 18.
34
One can already see how increased “worker protections” lead to increased corporate control.
Uber’s voluntary guaranteed-earnings program sets minimum hourly earnings to compensate for
cutting fares in certain cities, but brings significant restrictions on drivers’ flexibility. Gregory
Ferenstein, Uber to Cut Fares in 48 Cities, Promises to Guarantee Driver Earnings, VENTURE BEAT
(Jan. 8, 2015), http://venturebeat.com/2015/01/08/uber-well-guarantee-driver-earnings-in-everycity-where-were-cutting-prices [http://perma.cc/7MHR-EWMW].
33
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places public transit doesn’t reach, don’t have the option of simply
paying more. Those people have come to rely on Uber to solve this “last
mile problem,” and regulators have thus far struggled to present any
other feasible solution.35
2.

Over-Regulation/Bans Due to Regulatory Capture by Taxi
Cartels

While there has been some effort to cloak ridesharing regulations
in the language of consumer protection or labor rights,36 the
predominate force behind most new regulation and legislation has been
traditional taxi companies. In many cities, the taxi market has been
heavily regulated and dominated by a small number of cartels for
decades. Regulations generally have strictly limited the supply of
medallions—physical badges placed on each car showing that the owner
has a permit to operate in the city—which has allowed these cartels to
fairly effectively monopolize the market and keep potential competitors
out. By limiting the number of medallions in circulation, regulators
created artificial scarcity in the supply of taxis, allowing cabs to charge
above-market rates. The scarcity also raised the price of any medallions
that go on sale. Along with the myriad regulatory hurdles that an
independent driver often needs to jump over to be legally allowed to
accept fares, this dynamic has had the effect of raising significant
barriers to entry around the taxi industry, entrenching existing cartels
and providing them with little incentive to lower fares, adopt new
technologies, or improve service.
Once the rideshare app revolution began, however, the cartels’
control over for-hire transportation rapidly disappeared. In New York
City, medallion prices have plummeted from a peak of around $1.3
million in May 2013 to as little as $325,000 in April 201637 and NYC
35

See CENTER FOR NEIGHBORHOOD TECHNOLOGY (CNT), TRANSIT-ORIENTED DEVELOPMENT
CHICAGO REGION 3 (2013), http://www.cnt.org/sites/default/files/publications/CNT_TODIn
ChicagoRegion.pdf [https://perma.cc/CHN6-4JA3] (“Even dedicated transit users often are forced
to buy cars to meet transportation needs that transit cannot efficiently fill.”). For further
discussion on the difficulties associated with solving the last mile problem, see Hai Wang &
Amedeo Odoni, Approximating the Performance of a “Last Mile” Transportation System, 50
TRANSP. SCI. 659 (2016).
36
See, e.g., Matt Richtel, Distracted Driving and the Risks of Ride-Hailing Services Like Uber,
N.Y. TIMES: BITS (Dec. 21, 2014), http://bits.blogs.nytimes.com/2014/12/21/distracted-driving-andthe-risks-of-ride-hailing-services-like-uber [http://perma.cc/9ACA-3B3Y]; Faiz Siddiqui, Your
Uber Driver Is Twice as Likely to Cancel if You’re Black, WASH. POST (Nov. 1, 2016),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/tripping/wp/2016/11/01/your-uber-driver-is-twice-as-likely
-to-cancel-if-youre-black [http://perma.cc/6XNA-EEEY]. Similar criticisms can be found in the
academy. See, e.g., Koopman, supra note 16; Brishen Rogers, The Social Costs of Uber, 82 U. CHI.
L. REV. DIALOGUE 85 (2015).
37
Compare New York City Taxi and Limousine Commission, May 2013 Medallion Transfers
IN THE
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Yellow Taxis’ share of total trips fell by almost twenty-three percent
between April 2015 and April 2016.38 Monopolists are by definition not
huge fans of competition, so taxi companies across the country quickly
turned to lobbying their cities and states to do something about this
Uber startup poaching their business.39
Some of the anti-Uber regulations include increased insurance and
background check/fingerprinting requirements, fare restrictions
(including bans on surge pricing), route restrictions (e.g., no picking up
at the airport), medallion requirements, and outright bans.40 When the
D.C. Taxicab Commission issued proposed rulemakings in response to
the rise of ride-sharing apps in 2013, the Federal Trade Commission
issued a 15-page letter commenting on all the different ways the
proposed rules could impede competition.41 Anti-competitive rules
included the requirement that non-taxi for-fare cars (defined as
“sedans” within the larger subset of “luxury class vehicles”) must only
accept fares through a digital dispatching service, must “be black or
blue-black in color,” and weigh at least 3,200 pounds.42 Proposed rules
prohibited any association with existing taxicab companies, “making a
‘substantial change’ to [Uber’s] dispatch or payment solution . . .
without DCTC’s written approval” for two years, and required extensive
daily disclosures of information to the Taxicab Commission.43 New York
City has proposed regulations requiring ride-sharing companies to treat
(May 2013), http://www.nyc.gov/html/tlc/downloads/pdf/may_2013_medallion_transfers.pdf [htt
ps://perma.cc/LVB2-NHYB] with New York City Taxi and Limousine Commission, April 2016
Medallion Sales Chart (April 2016), http://www.nyc.gov/html/tlc/downloads/pdf/april_2016_me
dallion_transfers.pdf [https://perma.cc/4MD6-ZJS7].
38
Johana Bhuiyan, Uber Is Growing in NYC, but Yellow Taxis Still Do Double the Business,
RECODE (Jul. 11, 2016), http://www.recode.net/2016/7/11/12152564/uber-taxis-new-york [http://
perma.cc/G6SN-46QU].
39
See, e.g., Emily Badger, The Taxi Industry Is Crushing Uber and Lyft on the Lobbying Front,
3,500 to 1, WASH. POST (July 31, 2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/2014/07/
31/the-taxi-industry-is-crushing-uber-and-lyft-on-the-lobbying-front-3500-to-1 [https://perma.cc/B
F8L-EG7B].
40
See, e.g., Mike McPhate, Uber and Lyft End Rides in Austin to Protest Fingerprint
Background Checks, N.Y. TIMES (May 9, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/05/10/technology/
uber-and-lyft-stop-rides-in-austin-to-protest-fingerprint-background-checks.html [https://perma.
cc/FX6X-EPLM]; Harriet Taylor, Uber and Lyft Are Getting Pushback from Municipalities all over
the US, CNBC (Sept. 2, 2016, 11:51 AM ET) http://www.cnbc.com/2016/09/02/uber-and-lyft-aregetting-pushback-from-municipalities-all-over-the-us.html; Aamer Madhani, Chicago Taxi Group
Asks Appellate Court to Even Playing Field with Uber, USA TODAY (Sept. 19, 2016)
http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/2016/09/19/chicago-taxi-group-asks-appellate-court-even-pl
aying-field-uber/90706852 [https://perma.cc/J6H5-7LEZ].
41
Letter from Andrew I. Gavil et al., FTC to Jacques P. Lerner, General Counsel, District of
Columbia Taxicab Commission (June 7, 2013), https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/
advocacy_documents/ftc-staff-comments-district-columbia-taxicab-commission-concerning-propos
ed-rulemakings-passenger/130612dctaxicab.pdf [https://perma.cc/6GM2-32F4].
42
Id. at 4–5.
43
Id.
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drivers as employees and provide benefits, forcing all drivers of for-hire
vehicles to be compensated in the same way, and requiring a certain
percentage of Uber cars to be wheelchair accessible.44 Similar
regulations have popped up throughout the country, and while
“ridesharing has been able to expand in most areas relatively free of
burdensome regulations,”45 the ridesharing industry continues to face
constant threats of overly burdensome regulation pushed by entrenched
cartels.
Again, the negative effects of these restrictions hurt the poor and
geographically isolated people the most. Practices like surge pricing,
penalties for riders cancelling rides, drivers’ ability to rate riders, and
the fact that drivers are using their own cars on their own time
incentivize drivers to work a wider variety of hours and operate in
underserved areas.46 Anyone who’s ever tried to hail a cab at night in
Queens—or who’s been forced to choose between walking five miles
home or waiting an hour and a half for dispatch to send a cab that may
never arrive—understands just how much traditional taxis are failing
to serve large portions of the population. Unless you live in the middle
of a big (expensive) downtown area or only need to travel between hotels
and airports, taxis are expensive, unreliable, or simply not present.
Uber creates jobs for thousands of people. Drivers won’t get rich or
advance into the company’s management, and for most people driving
for Uber isn’t a great replacement for a full-time job offering benefits
and a more predictable paycheck. But it is a decently paying gig that
requires no real education or skills: as long as you’re a non-felon with a
driver’s license and access to a fairly modern car, you’re probably
qualified. The pearl-clutchers may turn their noses up at that, but for
millions of individuals with few marketable skills and limited
professional networks—particularly recent immigrants and racial
minorities—driving for Uber is one of the few opportunities available to
start making money and building a résumé. It also tends to pay better
than low-skill positions in retail or fast food.47 And there’s a substantial
44

OFFICE OF MAYOR BILL DEBLASIO, FOR-HIRE VEHICLE TRANSPORTATION STUDY 8–11 (2016),
http://www1.nyc.gov/assets/operations/downloads/pdf/For-Hire-Vehicle-Transportation-Study.pdf
[https://perma.cc/TPT7-PB5D].
45
Jared Meyer, From Regulating Uber to Subsidizing It, REASON (Mar. 14, 2016),
http://reason.com/archives/2016/03/14/from-regulating-uber-to-subsidizing-it [http://perma.cc/A9P
F-BB4R]
46
See ROSANNA SMART ET AL., FASTER & CHEAPER: HOW RIDE-SOURCING FILLS A GAP IN LOWINCOME LOS ANGELES NEIGHBORHOODS 4 (2015), http://botecanalysis.com/wp-content/uploads/
2015/07/LATS-Final-Report.pdf [https://perma.cc/CH3Y-FNX3] (finding that riders in low-income
areas of Los Angeles could expect to wait twice as long and pay twice as much for a taxi as for an
UberX ride on average).
47
Calculating the average hourly income of Uber drivers has proved difficult, as factors such
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intangible benefit that comes with effectively being your own boss. Uber
drivers get to choose when they work, where they work, and for how
long—a freedom and independence that people working a typical
minimum-wage job lack. Regulations that prevent Uber from operating
in a given area or limit the kinds of fares drivers can take kill these
opportunities, for the benefit of connected insiders.
Moreover, regulatory schemes that prevent or limit Uber’s access
to the taxi market harm not only the drivers and consumers interacting
directly with the company, but also the public at large. Jurisdictions
with no or limited Uber service forego all of the jobs that would be
created by the company’s presence, as well as the increase in incometax revenues. Having an affordable, convenient way to get home also
encourages people to go out on the town, spending money at stores,
restaurants, bars, and entertainment establishments—meaning that
anti-Uber cities and states lose out on potentially massive multiplier
benefits from increased consumer spending and revitalization of
downtown commercial areas. Finally, the 24/7 availability of easy-tosummon and easy-to-pay designated drivers means that areas with
widespread Uber use suffer from fewer drunk drivers. According to a
report by Mothers Against Drunk Driving, Uber’s entry into Seattle was
associated with a ten percent decrease in DUIs,48 and a Benenson
Strategy Group survey found that “88% of respondents over the age of
21 agree with the statement that ‘Uber has made it easier for me to
avoid driving home when I’ve had too much to drink,’” and 70–80
percent said Uber has made it less likely that their friends drive after
drinking.49
as age; gender; driving history; make, model, and age of car; city; neighborhood; and choice of hours
worked all vary widely from driver to driver (and even over time for the same driver). For example,
Uber itself claimed in 2015 that the nationwide average hourly income before expenses is $19 per
hour, Hall, supra note 30, at 23, while Buzzfeed News calculated the average income for drivers in
three cities to range between $8.77 and $13.17 per hour. Caroline O’Donovan & Jeremy SingerVine, How Much Uber Drivers Actually Make Per Hour, BUZZFEED NEWS (Jun. 22, 2016), https://
www.buzzfeed.com/carolineodonovan/internal-uber-driver-pay-numbers?utm_term=.ffgex0gWN#
.hegkqgG80 [https://perma.cc/YA4D-VERF]. The Buzzfeed analysis, however, did not account for
costs related to miles driven without a paying fare, the double payroll tax independent contractors
pay, or the fact that a significant amount of drivers’ expenses can be written off on their taxes. See
Jeremy Singer-Vine & Caroline O’Donovan, Methodology for Estimating Uber Drivers’ Hourly Net
Earnings, BUZZFEED NEWS (Jun. 22, 2016), https://www.buzzfeed.com/jsvine/methodology-forestimating-uber-drivers-hourly-net-earnings?utm_term=.un2vv3baAn#.goKkk9qzaN [https://per
ma.cc/WF4B-ZM4G]. It should be noted, though, that even most lower estimates of average driver
income are higher than the federal minimum wage of $7.25 per hour.
48
UBER & MOTHERS AGAINST DRUNK DRIVING, MORE OPTIONS. SHIFTING MINDSETS. DRIVING
BETTER CHOICES. 3 (2015), https://2q72xc49mze8bkcog2f01nlh-wpengine.netdna-ssl.com/wp-con
tent/uploads/2015/01/UberMADD-Report.pdf [http://perma.cc/4CJ5-MSPH].
49
Id. at 10. See also BENENSON STRATEGY GROUP, STUDY: DRINKING, DRIVING, AND
TRANSPORTATION OPTIONS, http://www.bsgco.com/insights/study-drinking-driving-and-transporta
tion-options [http://perma.cc/K69M-PFJ3] (last visited Dec. 12, 2016).
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Airbnb
1.

Regulatory Capture in the Airbnb Context

Much like how the regulatory attacks on Uber have been
spearheaded by the taxicab industry, opposition to Airbnb’s revolution
of the short-term rental market has emanated primarily from the hotel
industry. Concerned that the ability of residents to rent out their own
homes in a deregulated manner will hurt their bottom line, hotel
companies have lobbied for legislation that would hamper the new
business model. In the words of Jon Bortz, CEO of Pebblebrook Hotel
Trust: while his company used to have an “ability to price at maybe
what the customer would describe as sort of gouging rates . . . . I’d say
we’ve lost a lot of that ability at this point within the major markets
where these events [large events like Comic-Con International or music
festivals] take place.”50 The day before New York Governor Andrew
Cuomo signed a new law severely restricting the properties that can be
advertised on Airbnb, Mike Barnello, CEO of LaSalle Hotel Properties,
said that the new ban “should be a big boost in the arm for the business,
certainly in terms of pricing.”51
New York’s new law makes it illegal to advertise renting out an
entire apartment for less than 30 days.52 While it was already illegal
under the state’s Multiple Dwelling Law for an individual to rent out
his home for less than 30 days when they are themselves not physically
present,53 the new law makes the situation worse by making it easier
for the government to find and slap nonconforming hosts with a $7,500
fine—and opens Airbnb itself up to equal liability.54 In October 2016,
Airbnb filed a federal lawsuit challenging the law as a violation of the
company’s and hosts’ First Amendment rights and as preempted by the
Communications Decency Act, only to drop the case several weeks later
after the city promised not to prosecute Airbnb and only target its
users.55 This situation, unfortunate as it is, perfectly illustrates the
50

Craig Karmin, Airbnb Crimps Hotels’ Power on Pricing, WALL ST. J. (Sept. 29, 2015),
http://www.wsj.com/articles/airbnb-crimps-hotels-power-on-pricing-1443519181 [http://perma.cc/
MD25-HTFE].
51
Mike Barnello, LaSalle Hotel Properties Q3 2016 Earnings Conference Call Transcript (Oct.
20, 2016), http://seekingalpha.com/article/4013676-lasalle-hotel-properties-lho-ceo-mike-barnelloq3-2016-results-earnings-call-transcript [http://perma.cc/GQT4-RKT4].
52
N.Y. MULT. DWELL. LAW § 121 (Consol. 2016).
53
N.Y. MULT. DWELL. LAW § 4(8)(a) (Consol. 2016).
54
N.Y. MULT. DWELL. LAW § 121 (Consol. 2016).
55
Complaint, Airbnb v. Schneiderman, No. 16-cv-8239 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 21, 2016),
http://digitalcommons.law.scu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2314&context=historical [https://
perma.cc/S2QL-C6QW]; see Kate Conger, Airbnb Sues New York City, TECHCRUNCH (Oct. 21,
2016), https://techcrunch.com/2016/10/21/aibnb-sues-new-york-city [http://perma.cc/N8TP-4FYQ];
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problem of regulatory capture, and the danger of assuming businesses
and regulators are always adversaries. Airbnb, for all its lofty rhetoric
about protecting the rights of its users, ended its opposition to an
overbearing law as soon as it was able to make a deal that protected its
narrow interests, selling its own users out in the hopes of a cozy
relationship with regulators. After all, the only thing better than no
regulations are stringent regulations that don’t apply to you.
New York’s law is merely the best-publicized battle over hotelbacked anti-apartment-sharing regulations. The Santa Monica City
Council passed a similar ban in 2015.56 The first host prosecuted under
the ban entered into a plea deal in July 2016, agreeing to a $3,500 fine
and two years’ probation.57 In October 2016, a Nashville judge struck
down an ordinance that required potential hosts of short-term rentals
to first apply for a permit from the city. 58
2.

The Affordable Housing Problem

Most of the backlash against Airbnb, particularly in densely
populated cities like New York and San Francisco, has been justified on
the ground that nefarious landlords use the service to rent apartments
to tourists full-time. Activists and regulators claim that these “illegal
hotels” co-opt the already limited supply of affordable housing,
contributing to gentrification and forcing poor minorities out of their
own communities.
This is a compelling narrative—except that it simply isn’t backed
up by the facts on the ground. There is no indication that wealthy
speculators are buying up normal apartments to skirt regulations on
hotels. According to data obtained by the New York Times, seventy-five
percent of revenue earned by active hosts in New York City who share
their entire home came from people who have only one or two rental
listings on the platform.”59 Considering that a significant portion of
Nate Raymond, Airbnb, New York City Settle Rental Law Lawsuit, REUTERS (Dec. 5, 2016), http://
www.reuters.com/article/airbnb-new-york-idUSL1N1E00GE [https://perma.cc/WM6A-58TA].
56
Santa Monica, Cal., Home-sharing Ordinance Rules (Jul. 1, 2016), http://www.smgov.net/
uploadedFiles/Departments/PCD/Permits/Santa%20Monica%20HomeSharing%20Rules%20-%20
FINAL%20EFFECTIVE%20JUNE%2012%202015.pdf [https://perma.cc/BKV4-JTVL].
57
Hailey Branson-Potts, Santa Monica Convicts its First Airbnb Host Under Tough HomeSharing Laws, L.A. TIMES (Jul. 13, 2016), http://www.latimes.com/local/lanow/la-me-ln-santamonica-airbnb-conviction-20160713-snap-story.html [http://perma.cc/75ZQ-MXFV].
58
Nashville, Tenn., Ordinance No. BL2014-951, http://www.nashville.gov/mc/ordinances/
term_2011_2015/bl2014_951.htm [https://perma.cc/DMU7-8JZM]; Stacey Barchenger & Joey
Garrison, Judge: Nashville’s Airbnb Law Unconstitutional, TENNESSEAN (Oct. 21, 2016),
http://www.tennessean.com/story/news/2016/10/21/judge-metros-airbnb-law-unconstitutional/924
31324 [http://perma.cc/R8LP-BWP4].
59
Mike Isaac, Airbnb Releases Trove of New York City Home-Sharing Data, N.Y. TIMES (Dec.
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Airbnb rentals are for single bedrooms in host-occupied homes, even
that number may be misleadingly low. The vast majority of Airbnb
hosts are renting out either their own home or a single investment
property (presumably an otherwise vacant vacation home)—a far cry
from the robber barons playing Monopoly with other people’s homes
that people like New York Mayor Bill De Blasio appear to be concerned
about.60
What one sees after looking at the data Airbnb has released about
its users is that the average host is an ordinary person of no great
means who occasionally rents out their home in order to make ends
meet in a high-rent area. According to Airbnb’s New York City
Economic Impact Report, seventy-eight percent of New York hosts earn
“low, moderate, or middle incomes” and seventy-two percent “use the
money they earn sharing their space to stay in their homes.”61 The
median income earned from being a host was only $5,110—a
substantial sum for an empty nester renting out an extra room, but
hardly the amount one would expect for the owner of an illicit hotel in
the country’s most expensive city.62
Opponents of online apartment-sharing like to blame the business
model for the housing shortages currently plaguing cities like New York
and San Francisco.63 But New York’s housing shortage was a problem
long before Airbnb came on the scene in 2008. City and state officials
recognized the lack of available housing as an issue as early as 1936.64

1, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/12/02/technology/airbnb-releases-trove-of-new-york-cityhome-sharing-data.html [http://perma.cc/QLS8-P9EZ].
60
Ariel Stulberg, Airbnb’s “Commercial Listings” Should Be Regulated Like Businesses: de
Blasio, REAL DEAL (Mar. 4, 2016), http://therealdeal.com/2016/03/04/airbnbs-commercial-listingsshould-be-treated-like-businesses-de-blasio [http://perma.cc/8NPK-Q56Y]; Azi Paybarah, De
Blasio Opposes Airbnb, Quinn Tries to ‘Thread the Needle’ for Them, POLITICO (Apr. 26, 2013),
http://www.politico.com/states/new-york/city-hall/story/2013/04/de-blasio-opposes-airbnb-quinntries-to-thread-the-needle-for-them-000000 [https://perma.cc/D7VL-M9SH].
61
AIRBNB, ECONOMIC IMPACT REPORT: NEW YORK CITY (Nov. 17, 2015), https://new-yorkcity.airbnbcitizen.com/economic-impact-reports/data-on-the-airbnb-community-in-nyc/ [https://per
ma.cc/45C4-VBRM].
62
Id. In 2014, New York had the highest average hotel room in the country, at $271, beating
second-place San Francisco by more than $50. Average U.S. Hotel Prices Increased by Five Percent
in 2014, HOTELS.COM (Mar. 5, 2015), http://press.hotels.com/en-us/hpi/average-u-s-hotel-pricesincreased-by-five-percent-in-2014 [http://perma.cc/7JND-XJMB].
63
See, e.g., Rachel Monroe, More Guests, Empty Houses, SLATE: MONEYBOX (Feb. 13, 2014),
http://www.slate.com/articles/business/moneybox/2014/02/airbnb_gentrification_how_the_sharin
g_economy_drives_up_housing_prices.html [http://perma.cc/QD8R-VGR9].
64
Timothy L. Collins, “Fair Rents” or “Forced Subsidies” Under Rent Regulation: Finding a
Regulatory Taking Where Legal Fictions Collide, 59 ALB. L. REV. 1293, 1312–13 (1996) (stating
that the city’s first rent-control law was put into effect to deal with the post-WWII housing
shortage, but the problem started even earlier: “While a housing shortage began to appear as early
as 1936, the shortage was largely concealed because the Great Depression had forced many
families to double up.”) (citing REPORT OF THE JOINT LEGISLATIVE COMMITTEE TO RECODIFY THE
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Indeed, high rents and limited housing have been features of life in
Gotham for generations and can hardly be placed, solely or
substantially, at the feet of new players like Airbnb.
Research conducted by the National Bureau of Economic Research
shows that the primary reason why New York rent is so high is actually
over-regulation. The study found that land-use regulations, such as
“quantity controls, myriad zoning rules, or taxes and fees” heavily limit
and increase the costs of new construction.65 In 2002, this created a
regulatory burden for the median condo in Manhattan that accounted
for fifty-six percent of the construction price.66 The study also concluded
that for half of Manhattan condo dwellers, regulations cost at least
$5,500 a year; for others, the cost was even higher.67 Wealthy antidevelopment New York owners have also misused the city’s historicalpreservation ordinance to protect their own property values. The law—
ostensibly intended to preserve buildings of particular historical,
cultural, or architectural importance—now covers more than a quarter
of all Manhattan, according to a recent report by the NYU Furman
Center.68 This elitist NIMBYism can be seen clearly when one examines
the percent of landmarked buildings by neighborhood: between 30 and
80 percent of wealthy neighborhoods like SoHo, TriBeCa, the Upper
West Side, and the Upper East Side are preserved, while lower-income
neighborhoods like East Harlem, Harlem, the East Village, and Lower
East Side have comparatively low rates of preservation, 0.8–10.5
percent of lots.69 New York’s historical-preservation law, whatever its
original purpose, is now largely used to artificially suppress
development in wealthy neighborhoods, forcing low and middle income
individuals into increasingly crowded and expensive buildings in “less
desirable” parts of town.70
The other half of the puzzle is rent control, which has long been an
urban-progressive shibboleth. Rent-stabilization programs are
ostensibly meant to ensure that low-income people don’t get forced out
of their communities by gentrification. But in practice, rent control
MULTIPLE DWELLING LAW (1946)).
65
Edward L. Glaeser et al., Why Is Manhattan So Expensive? Regulation and the Rise in House
Prices 3–8 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 10124, 2003), http://www.nber.org/
papers/w10124.pdf [https://perma.cc/ARZ6-ZTFW].
66
Id. at 18 n. 19.
67
Id. at 19.
68
INGRID GOULD ELLEN ET AL., FIFTY YEARS OF HISTORIC PRESERVATION IN NEW YORK CITY
21 (2016), http://bit.ly/2930m6y [https://perma.cc/KA64-D4BB].
69
REAL ESTATE BOARD OF NEW YORK, AN ANALYSIS OF LANDMARKED PROPERTIES IN
MANHATTAN 4 (2013), http://bit.ly/1mQKrVp [https://perma.cc/2QLR-8BMN].
70
See REAL ESTATE BOARD OF NEW YORK, LANDMARKING, HOUSING PRODUCTION, AND
DEMOGRAPHICS IN NYC 7 (2015), http://bit.ly/29poBbI [https://perma.cc/FD2R-2JWX].
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tends to help a relatively small (and wealthy, and white) group of lucky
individuals who have been able to keep old apartments off the market
and in the family.71 The primary effect of rent-control programs is that
a privileged few get to pay well below market price for their apartments,
subsidized by everyone else in the neighborhood, whose rents are
increased to compensate.72 Rent control disincentivizes new
construction and investment in residential real estate, which
contributes to a housing shortage and higher rents for uncontrolled
units.73
The fact is that the affordable-housing shortages plaguing many of
America’s major cities have been caused not by an innovative app, but
by decades of heavy-handed regulatory, zoning, and tax policies. While
it is not yet entirely clear what the precise effect Airbnb has on rental
prices—recent analyses suggest that its use may correlate with modest
increases in rents in areas where the app is particularly popular74—it
is at most a minor factor compared to the various land-use restrictions
that limit housing stock. There are reasons to think Airbnb might
actually help the situation, because it provides an extra source of
income for low-income people living in high-rent areas. This can be
especially valuable because it doesn’t require taking on a second or
third shift, or the sort of manual labor that a disabled or elderly person
is unable to do.
II. SUBSIDIES AND OTHER FORMS OF PATRONAGE
The previous section demonstrates how restrictive regulations
have often been the tool by which established businesses have
maintained market share and guarded against new entrants. This
dynamic in essence results in the government pushing down all
businesses in a segment of the market—a seemingly neutral action but

71

HENRY O. POLLAKOWSKI, WHO REALLY BENEFITS FROM NEW YORK CITY’S RENT REGULATION
SYSTEM? 13 (2003), http://www.manhattan-institute.org/pdf/cr_34.pdf [https://perma.cc/A8JLZXF9] (“This study finds that tenants in low- and moderate-income areas receive little or no benefit
from rent stabilization, while tenants in more affluent locations are effectively subsidized for a
substantial portion of their rent.”).
72
The High Cost of Rent Control, NAT’L MULTIFAMILY HOUSING COUNCIL, http://www.nmhc.
org/News/The-High-Cost-of-Rent-Control/ [http://perma.cc/X8YY-XTSF] (last visited Jan. 23,
2017) (Beneficiaries of rent control in Berkeley and Santa Monica, California were “predominately
white, well-educated, young professionally employed and affluent.”) (quoting RICHARD J.
DEVINE, WHO BENEFITS FROM RENT CONTROLS? (1986)).
73
See generally Richard A. Epstein, Rent Control and the Theory of Efficient Regulation, 54
BROOKLYN L. REV. 741 (1988).
74
See Ariel Stulberg, Airbnb Probably Isn’t Driving Rents Up Much, At Least Not Yet,
FIVETHIRTYEIGHT (Aug. 24, 2016), http://fivethirtyeight.com/features/airbnb-probably-isntdriving-rents-up-much-at-least-not-yet [http://perma.cc/3EPH-YLMW].
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one favoring those who already have their footing. The damning effects
for the market and its consumers are clear: the government’s downward
pressure necessarily lowers the economic level. But what effects result
if instead of pushing down on all, the government chooses to lift up a
few? Do subsidies and other forms of patronage have negative effects
equal to restrictive regulations?
A.

Generally
1.

Distort Prices and Raise Demand

Perhaps surprisingly, subsidies for insiders can be just as
damaging to the economy as overly aggressive regulations. That’s
because, once again, the government is stepping in to meddle with the
incentives and response mechanisms that allow a market to function.
Subsidies distort and artificially reduce the price that consumers pay
while allowing the subsidized company to continue seeing the same
return, with the taxpayers generally footing the bill. This “push[es]
prices up by making it appear that prices are lower and artificially
raising demand.”75 What ends up happening is that consumers still pay
something around the original undistorted price, while also paying
what amounts to a free gift to the subsidized company through their tax
dollars. The company has no incentive to lower its prices or innovate
because it now has a leg up on the competition—and the product
consumers are paying for drops in quality. Examples of this process in
action can be found in the student-loan market,76 farm subsidies for
crops like sugar,77 and publicly financed professional-sports stadiums,78
among dozens of other industries that are subsidized in some fashion
by at least one level of government.79

75

Jared Meyer, From Regulating Uber to Subsidizing It, REASON (Mar. 14, 2016),
http://reason.com/archives/2016/03/14/from-regulating-uber-to-subsidizing-it [http://perma.cc/A9
PF-BB4R].
76
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17, 2015), http://www.forbes.com/sites/jaredmeyer/2015/09/17/gop-debate-student-loan-debt [htt
ps://perma.cc/9L3R-S3MQ].
77
Jared Meyer, Big Sugar: Sanders and Rubio Share a Sweet Tooth, FORBES (Aug. 25, 2015),
http://www.forbes.com/sites/jaredmeyer/2015/08/25/sanders-rubio-support-costly-sugar-subsidies
[https://perma.cc/PL4N-FUY8].
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Jared Meyer, You Might As Well Watch the NFL Playoffs. You’re Paying for Them, REASON
(Jan. 14, 2016), http://reason.com/archives/2016/01/14/you-might-as-well-watch-the-nfl-playoffs
[https://perma.cc/KNX9-MQ77].
79
See Niraj Chokshi, The United States of Subsidies: The Biggest Corporate Winners in Each
State, WASH. POST (Mar. 18, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/govbeat/wp/2015/03/
17/the-united-states-of-subsidies-the-biggest-corporate-winners-in-each-state [http://perma.cc/CC
P8-F8C2].
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Regulatory Capture Distorts Incentives

Subsidized companies have little incentive to innovate or improve
their product or service because the subsidies insulate them from
failure and make it more difficult for unsubsidized firms to compete.
Depending on the level of subsidy, companies receiving their free money
are able to undercut competitors by selling their products at a price
below the cost to produce. Subsidies are really another side of the same
over-regulatory coin: The selective use of subsidies can be just as
effective a weapon against disfavored parties as taxes or compliance
costs.
Subsidies and preferential regulatory treatment can also reduce
the amount businesses themselves have to invest in order to enter a
given market, making them literally less invested in the long-term
health of that market. This can be seen in cities like Washington, D.C.,
and New London, Connecticut, where the government forced businesses
and residents out of struggling neighborhoods in order to make room
for Wal-Mart and Pfizer, respectively. Both companies reneged on their
promises to move in, with the local communities paying the price. The
New London debacle gave rise to the infamous 2005 Supreme Court
case Kelo v. City of New London,80 and the former site of plaintiff
Suzette Kelo’s family home still lies vacant, more than 10 years later.81
The situation in Washington appears likely to reach a similar
anticlimax. 82
3.

Subsidies Undermine Democracy

When lobbying has a better return on investment than research
and development or capital investment, you can’t be surprised when
companies focus more on the former than the latter. What may have
started as a good-faith effort to stimulate a certain sector of the economy
can easily develop into a tacit quid pro quo relationship between
politicians eager for reelection and companies more than willing to
write checks for continued access. The sort of “pay-to-play” system that
the liberal use of subsidies encourages not only makes it difficult for
consumers to make decisions in a distorted market, but also further
80

545 U.S. 469 (2005).
Ilya Somin, Lessons from a Little Pink House, 10 Years Later, WALL ST. J. (June 21, 2015),
http://www.wsj.com/articles/lessons-from-a-little-pink-house-10-years-later-1434922686 [http://
perma.cc/YU2P-8LUZ].
82
Courtland Milloy, Walmart Backs Out of D.C. Deal Citing Costs, and City’s Poorest Pay the
Price, WASH. POST (Jan. 19, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/walmart-backs-out-ofdc-deal-citing-costs-and-citys-poorest-pay-the-price/2016/01/19/af963e00-becb-11e5-9443-7074c36
45405_story.html.
81

18 SHAPIRO-MCDONALD PROOF G.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

461]

REGULATION UBER ALLES

12/2/17 9:13 PM

483

removes the average citizen from the actual process of deciding what
policies their state or the nation should use.
B.

Uber

On March 21, 2016, Altamonte Springs, Florida (an Orlando
suburb), became the first city to begin subsidizing Uber rides.83
According to the city’s website: “The City is providing a 20% discount
on all Uber trips that both begin and end in the city limits, meaning
riders pay less. As an added benefit to encourage increased SunRail
[Central Florida’s commuter rail system] ridership, all trips starting or
ending at the Altamonte Springs SunRail station will receive a 25%
discount.”84 Altamonte Springs has since been joined by nearby Pinellas
County, Florida, and Dublin, California (a Bay Area suburb), who have
also launched one-year pilot programs.85 And while this may appear to
be a smart, market-based alternative to other more expensive public
transportation options, creating a new government-backed monopoly to
replace the old government-backed monopoly does nothing to solve the
underlying cost and quality problems public transportation often faces.
Subsidizing Uber will likely lead to regulatory capture by Uber
rather than by the taxi cartels. Uber is now a big, rich company that
can afford to keep phalanxes of lawyers and lobbyists on its payroll. The
“start-up” may not generally want regulation now, but you better
believe that it’ll make the most of it once it is there. This can already be
seen in the above examples, where cities have singled out Uber by name
in their legislation as the target of favorable subsidies. In Altamonte
Springs, other ride-sharing apps such as Lyft are now left at a
competitive disadvantage and will be incentivized to carve out their
own exclusive territories, while the next generation of innovative
transportation solutions will face an even greater uphill battle against
entrenched companies that have both greater resources and the
83

Barbara Liston, Uber Teams with Florida City on Public Transit Test, REUTERS (Mar. 3,
2016), http://www.reuters.com/article/us-uber-tech-subsidies-idUSKCN0W52LQ [http://perma.cc/
T56V-XLA8].
84
Uber, CITY OF ALTAMONTE SPRINGS, http://www.altamonte.org/index.aspx?NID=736 [htt
ps://perma.cc/A2XV-VFTZ] (last visited Dec. 12, 2016).
85
Pinellas County pays for half of Uber riders’ fares (up to $3) for trips to or from a bus stop,
and provides up to 23 free intracounty rides per month for “economically disadvantaged riders.”
Uber Announces Partnership to Increase Transportation Access in Tampa Bay, UBER NEWSROOM
(Feb. 22, 2016), https://newsroom.uber.com/us-florida/uber-announces-partnership-to-increasetransportation-access-in-tampa-bay/ [http://perma.cc/6C9A-Z4XP]; Making Ridesharing More
Affordable in Pinellas County, UBER NEWSROOM (Aug. 4, 2016), https://newsroom.uber.com/usflorida/psta-td [http://perma.cc/G65E-DT83]. Dublin subsidizes fares so passengers pay “$3 for
trips within West Dublin and $5 within the East Dublin project area.” Denis Cuff, Bay Area Transit
System to Subsidize Uber, Lyft Rides, MERCURY NEWS (Aug. 18, 2016), http://www.mercurynews.co
m/2016/08/18/bay-area-transit-system-to-subsidize-uber-lyft-rides [http://perma.cc/N7KE-G9V5].
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protection of the government on their side. In their eagerness to
embrace and support one particular disruptive innovator, governments
may unintentionally kill the next disruptive innovator. Uber, Airbnb,
and others of their kind have been an incredible boon to the lives of
millions of Americans, but the business model isn’t perfect. No
technology is perfect. New “disruptive” companies are starting up
constantly, but every barrier to entry—whether a debilitating tax or an
anticompetitive subsidy—makes it more difficult for those innovators
to survive long enough to move society forward. While we shouldn’t let
the perfect be the enemy of the good, it’s equally true that we shouldn’t
let the good be the enemy of the better.
III. CONCLUSION
The problems detailed in this article—over-regulation and
misguided subsidies stifling innovation, regulatory capture by wellconnected insiders—are not unique to government involvement in the
sharing economy. They are systemic and common to economic
interventions of all types and at all levels. They are the fundamental
consequences of centralized attempts to control the lives of large
numbers of complex individuals interacting with each other. Good
intentions won’t prevent powerful economic interests from
manipulating the regulatory process to their advantage. No army of
policy wonks is going to be able to change the fact that subsidies
increase prices by artificially inflating demand, or that price controls
create shortages. No amount of data-gathering can possibly give any
one individual—or an entire administrative agency, for that matter—
the ability to foresee and prevent all of the potentially harmful
consequences of regulatory action. Those looking for a regulatory
framework that is immune to regulatory capture or that won’t have
unintended side effects are missing the point.
Legislators and agency officials should seek to roll back existing
regulations not clearly and primarily supported by a substantial publicinterest rationale. They should seriously examine the practical
consequences of even those regulations that appear to serve the public
interest, searching for evidence of regulatory capture or good-faith
mistaken assumptions. Regulators should always begin from a
presumption of liberty and non-regulation—particularly in areas of
rapid technological change—and consider whether their proposed
regulation is the most narrowly tailored solution available to a genuine
market failure.
Courts must likewise take their responsibility of judicial review
seriously. They must resist the impulse to blindly defer to the
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government, and actively strike down regulations that aren’t rationally
related to legitimate governmental interests.86
Ultimately, what we need to do is trust workers and consumers to
make good choices for themselves. Give the American people an
opportunity to create their own future; you won’t be disappointed.

86

For an in-depth explication of the sort of judicial engagement we advocate for here, see
generally CLARK M. NEILY III, TERMS OF ENGAGEMENT: HOW OUR COURTS SHOULD ENFORCE THE
CONSTITUTION’S PROMISE OF LIMITED GOVERNMENT (2013).

